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International Arbitration and
Judicial Intervention
ROBERT E. LUTZ*
The relationship of judicial intervention to international arbitra-
tion and conciliation is an intriguing topic. Such topics frequently
require the skills of cartoonists to reveal their essential nature. I re-
cently came across a cartoon in, I believe, New Yorker Magazine that
had a sketch of a head angel sitting at Heaven's judgment table and
across from him were the various "bad angels" with pitchforks and
horns, etc. The head good angel assigns the various destinies in the
following way: "Then it's agreed: Watson, Smith, Teller and Wilson
go to Heaven; Jones, Paducci and Homer go to Hell; and Fenton and
Miller go to arbitration." I'm pleased to be here on this blessed
occasion.
I. THE BASIC PARADOX
My task is to address the topic of "International Arbitration and
Judicial Intervention." Although a somewhat abstract title, it repre-
sents a very real nexus which is ever so important, most interesting
and almost paradoxical: on the one hand, the judiciary is often essen-
tial in guaranteeing the integrity of the arbitral process, while on the
other hand, the fear of involvement by the judiciary is precisely the
reason many parties enter into arbitration.
A. United States Legal Environment
I start from the premise that the United States has one of the
most accommodating environments for international commercial ar-
bitration of any country in the world. Here on the west coast of the
United States, there have been significant efforts to make the interna-
tional arbitration environment even more advantageous than the rest
of the country, especially for Pacific Basin parties. In Los Angeles, a
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number of leading business persons and lawyers established the
Center for International Commercial Arbitration in 1986. Among
the supporters of this effort have been the American Arbitration As-
sociation (AAA), the Asian/Pacific Dispute Resolution Center, and a
wide variety of civic groups, including the Los Angeles Chamber of
Commerce and the Mayor's Office.
The Center, which provides international arbitration and concili-
ation services, has adopted the UNCITRAL arbitration rules and also
has conciliation rules. With the new California International Arbitra-
tion and Conciliation Act, California now has the finest legal environ-
ment for international arbitration in the country, if not the world.
This is, of course, an appropriate and overdue development. After all,
California is now the sixth largest economy in the world with nearly
two-thirds of California trade and forty-percent of all west coast trade
flowing through Los Angeles. The sixty mile radius around Los An-
geles contains the second largest concentration of population, employ-
ment, business, industry and finance in the United States.
B. General Problems of Judicial Intervention
Returning to the topic at hand, International Arbitration and Ju-
dicial Intervention, it must be appreciated that transnational arbitra-
tion can never be totally divorced from court litigation. If for any
reason one party refuses to cooperate, the other party must, at some
point, seek judicial assistance. There are important trends, however,
about the way in which judicial intervention may be employed and
limited. In order to meet the needs of commerce, many countries
have substituted judicial support for earlier interference with transna-
tional arbitration, in particular with respect to the validity of arbitral
compacts and the recognition of foreign awards. Noteworthy, in this
regard are the United Kingdom's Arbitration Act of 1979, the 1981
French Decree, and the UNCITRAL Model Act. These have each,
in their own way, removed a number of the obstacles created by judi-
cial intervention. The New York Convention of 1958, the European
Convention of 1961, and the Inter-American Convention of 1975 all
provide limited grounds for denial of recognition and enforcement of
foreign awards.
There are a number of areas in international arbitration where
there are likely to be judicial intervention problems. These areas are:
general or miscellaneous issues; the enforcement of the arbitral agree-
ment itself; judicial control over the arbitral proceedings; and judicial
622 [Vol. 10:621
Symposium: Judicial Intervention
control over the award. The first three categories are briefly ad-
dressed in the following discussion.
II. AREAS OF JUDICIAL INTERVENTION
A. General and Miscellaneous Issues
There is a lack of consensus on what is the meaning of a "trans-
national" as opposed to a "domestic" award, resulting often in judi-
cial intervention. Many countries crudely rely on geographical
factors-the seat of arbitration or the nationality or residence of the
parties involved-to characterize the transnational arbitral proceed-
ing. Other countries, more progressive in their outlook on these mat-
ters, take into account party autonomy in the selection of procedural
rules.
Differing judicial treatment of sovereign immunity also illus-
trates another possible area of judicial intrusion into international ar-
bitration. From the date of execution of arbitral agreements through
the proceedings and ultimately at the time of the enforcement of the
award, the presence of a state as a party in an arbitration affords
courts many opportunities to intervene in the proceedings and apply
different standards. There are other areas of potential judicial inter-
vention and these include questions that may arise as to the form of
the arbitration agreement: whether the domestic law and relevant in-
ternational conventions require the arbitral agreement to be "in writ-
ing," and what that term means. Certainly, in cases of ordinary
commercial transactions (as contrasted with truly negotiated deals), it
may be quite difficult to ascertain the appropriate meaning and, there-
fore, such cases may call for judicial adjudication.
The question of arbitrability is yet another area of potential judi-
cial intervention. Even those countries most favorable to arbitration
still restrict its use with respect to certain subject matter. Matters
having high public policy potential as industrial property rights, anti-
trust, securities and employment contracts may, in some cases, not be
arbitrable. But, there is a trend rejecting that approach. We are see-
ing a substantial erosion of the aversion to arbitrate such issues, espe-
cially when the prescribed arbitration is "international" in character.
Judicial intervention may also occur on the issue of the selection
of the seat of arbitration, especially where the site is in a "neutral"
country where the legal system in fact may not be as friendly as origi-
nally supposed. And just the mere poor draftsmanship of an agree-
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ment invites issues of interpretation and, therefore, judicial
intervention.
Despite these possible areas of judicial intervention, George De-
lame, a commentator on these matters, has written that many of the
real difficulties faced by the nexus of the courts and transnational
commercial arbitrations can be avoided by giving due attention to
matters relating to the formal and substantive validity of the arbitra-
tion agreement. Therefore, recourse to the judiciary should be con-
fined within relatively narrow limits, and, specifically in the area of
the enforcement of the arbitral agreement, to issues concerning: the
scope of consent to the arbitration and its continued effectiveness; and
to the severability of the arbitration clause from the main contract to
which it relates.
B. Judicial Control Over Arbitration Proceedings
1. Initiation
Judicial control can occur with respect to the arbitral proceed-
ing-both at the initiation of the proceedings, and during the arbitra-
tion. The modem view regarding this category of problems is that
judicial involvement at these phases, should be supportive, not intru-
sive. It should refrain from interfering with the arbitrators' powers
and assist them or the parties when the need arises. Judicial involve-
ment, although supportive, draws its justification from the observa-
tion that the powers of arbitrators are not coextensive with those of
the judiciary, and that courts may use their imperium to fill the gap.
At the initiation of an arbitration, you have the general principle
in the United States and in other countries, that courts will stay judi-
cial proceedings brought by one of the parties in violation of the arbi-
tration clause. Also, at the initiation of arbitration, issues concerning
the appointment, replacement, or removal of arbitrators may arise.
These are normally handled in accordance with the arbitration rules
specified in advance in the contract or agreed to at the time of arbitra-
tion. In arbitrations where one party does not cooperate-refuses to
appoint another arbitrator, etc.-the other party may request the
court to do so. There are some differences from country to country
with respect to how courts might support the arbitral process and
handle such recalcitrants. In the United States, pursuant to the Fed-
eral Arbitration Act, the federal courts may direct that arbitrations be
held in accordance with the agreement at any place therein provided
for, whether that place is within or without the United States.
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2. During Arbitration
During the arbitration, it can be stated that courts generally ex-
ercise restraint in interfering with the conduct of the arbitration pro-
ceedings. However, judicial support might be necessary in some
instances, such as where decisions beyond the powers of arbitrators
and falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts are required:
where means of compulsion are necessary. This may occur where a
party refuses to produce evidence. Few sanctions are really available
to the arbitrator to compel such production, except that an arbitrator
may often draw inferences against that party for his or her lack of
cooperation. On the other hand, judicial support of the arbitral pro-
cess on such occasions would add sufficient authority to compel
cooperation.
3. Discovery
The question of the appropriateness of judicial intervention dur-
ing an international arbitration is addressed by the uniquely United
States pretrial phenomenon known as "discovery." Often perceived
as a procedure which undermines the supposed advantages of arbitra-
tion, especially speed and cost, practitioners and commentators have
nonetheless generally agreed that a limited form of discovery is help-
ful in the arbitral process. It can provide an important fact-finding
capacity and can improve the quality and quantity of documentary
evidence with which the arbitral tribunal makes its decision.
Notwithstanding these advantages, foreign parties in particular
fear being involved in the wide-ranging prehearing discovery fre-
quently associated with litigation in the United States, and inaccu-
rately assume arbitrations are subject to the same kind of treatment.
This misconception is due to a misunderstanding of how United
States law applies to international arbitration. The procedures for ob-
taining evidence for presentation to an arbitral tribunal are not gov-
erned by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure nor the procedural law
of a particular state. Rather, the procedural rules for arbitral hear-
ings are provided by the rules that the parties choose for the arbitra-
tion. For example, the AAA's rules provide that parties may offer
evidence which is relevant and material to the dispute and shall pro-
duce such additional evidence as the arbitrator may deem necessary
to an understanding and determination of the dispute. The UNCI-
TRAL rules, adopted in large part by the Center for International
Commercial Arbitration in Los Angeles as well as by other centers of
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arbitration, provide that the arbitral tribunal may require a party to
deliver to the tribunal or the other party a summary of documents or
other evidence which the party intends to present. The UNCITRAL
rules further provide arbitral tribunal may require parties to produce
documents, exhibits or other evidence as the tribunal shall determine.
Incidentally, the Center for International Commercial Arbitration in
Los Angeles specifically provides that, unless agreed to by the parties,
there shall be no other "formal discovery." As a last example, section
seven of the Federal Arbitration Act grants arbitrators broad discre-
tionary powers to require the production of documents.
Given this legal framework which provides parties with the flexi-
bility to determine the procedural rules applicable to their arbitration,
and confers upon the arbitrator broad discretionary authority to de-
termine the amount, if any, of discovery to be undertaken in a given
arbitration, how do courts operate when one party requests discovery
in aid of an arbitration proceeding? Generally, both federal and state
courts have taken the view that courts should not significantly inter-
fere at the prehearing stage of the arbitration by subjecting a party
(foreign or domestic) to federal or state discovery rules which are
likely to increase costs and delays.
Some cases have allowed discovery under the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act on the issue of whether there was an agreement to arbitrate
(which the court must decide before staying a suit and directing par-
ties to proceed to arbitration). Some have also allowed it on the issue
of whether there are sufficient statutory grounds for vacating, modify-
ing or correcting the arbitral award. However, in a long line of cases,
courts have denied-with limited exception-requests by parties for
discovery in aid of arbitration proceedings. The rule, then, is that
discovery under court supervision will not be granted except under
extraordinary circumstances and then only where it is shown to be
absolutely necessary for the protection of the rights of a party. In
short, necessity, rather than convenience, is the test.
The reasoning supporting this rule falls into two categories. The
first line of reasoning relies on the notion of contractual autonomy.
By voluntarily agreeing to employ arbitration as the mode for settling
disputes, parties choose to utilize procedures peculiar to the arbitral
process rather than those followed in judicial determinations. Having
chosen to arbitrate, a party is estopped from urging through a request
for discovery a blend of litigation and arbitration approaches.
The second line of reasoning argues that discovery is simply in-
626 [Vol. 10:621
Symposium: Judicial Intervention
compatible with a main objective of arbitration, which is to resolve
the dispute within the shortest possible time. The availability of dis-
closure devices is a significant differentiating factor between judicial
and arbitral proceedings. An arbitration proceeding, so the argument
goes, is deliberately taken outside the court's realm and jurisdiction
by the choice and commitment of the parties.
III. SUBSTITUTING JUDICIAL SUPPORT
Much more could be said about the ever present tension between
judicial intervention and international arbitration. With the increas-
ing use of non-litigation resolution processes and the judiciary's desire
to reduce its dockets, one might presume that there would be judicial
support for the international arbitration process. For transnational
commerce to succeed, parties need the freedom to structure transac-
tions to their satisfaction, which may mean limited intervention by
the courts. By resorting to proper techniques of judicial avoidance,
parties may eliminate most, if not all, of the issues likely to frustrate
their legitimate expectations. Proper exercise of party autonomy,
coupled with attention to basic issues of form, substance and care in
drafting an arbitration agreement, should greatly facilitate the en-
forcement of arbitral agreements and their awards, and substitute ju-
dicial support for judicial control.
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